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Abstract—In this paper we present a multicommodity band-
width exchange model for balancing aggregated communica-
tion bandwidth resources (BACBR) that allows us to aggre-
gate similar oﬀers. In this model oﬀers submitted to sell (or
buy) the same, similar, or equivalent network resources (or de-
mands for end-to-end connections) are aggregated into single
commodities. BACBR model is based on the balancing com-
munication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model. It requires much
less variables and constraints then original BCBT, however
the outcomes need to be disaggregated. The general model
for disaggregation is also given in the paper.
Keywords— aggregation, auctions, bandwidth market, market
clearing, multicommodity trade.
1. Introduction
The multicommodity exchange models are promising tools
that allows to answer emerging requirements for eﬃcient,
optimized trading mechanisms well suited on the compet-
itive bandwidth markets. A complex and dynamic band-
width trading environment is broadly believed to be devel-
oped [1]–[4], as new technological and conceptual oppor-
tunities are rapidly appearing. For new markets, requir-
ing thousands of bids and oﬀers to be auctioned, the to-
day most popular communication bandwidth trading tools,
such as bilateral agreements, or current simple auctions
and exchanges (that aim mainly in facilitating buyer-seller
contacts), are not suﬃcient.
For the purpose of modeling trade of bandwidth resources
in the communication networks, we assume that the net-
work consists of nodes connected by links. The inter-node
link may represent a network resource, that can be an el-
ementary commodity on the bandwidth market. However,
network resources being traded can be more complex and
can be composed of many parallel links, or end-to-end node
connections represented by paths or subnetworks.
In this paper we present a multicommodity bandwidth
exchange model for balancing aggregated communication
bandwidth resources (BACBR), that considers aggregation
of oﬀers submitted to buy or sell the same, similar, or
equivalent commodities, related to the network resources.
The bandwidth trading is considered from the viewpoint of
many network operators, service providers and other whole-
sale active market players, buying and selling bandwidth.
We believe that the current research proposals for auc-
tioning bandwidth are still insuﬃcient to address diverse
market participants needs and requirements. One such
a need is the end-to-end network paths trading under com-
petition – when multiple parallel link resources can be
oﬀered for sale, or multiple end-to-end connections are
bidding.
To cope with the problem of providing bidders with pos-
sibility of submitting oﬀers for bundles of elementary
commodities when auctioning bandwidth, researchers have
proposed two approaches: simultaneous, single link auc-
tions [5]–[8] and combinatorial auctions [9]. In the ﬁrst
approach special, iterative mechanisms are required to co-
ordinate individual links-auctions. The second approach
requires buyers to specify the particular links that con-
stitute a desired path. Both approaches lead to welfare
ineﬃciency, as was shown in [10].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
proposed model. The mathematical statements both of bal-
ancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) and new
BACBR models are given in Section 3. We also show, that
the aggregated model BACBR has all positive features of
the simple BCBT model, such as maximization of global
economic surplus and possibility of placing buy oﬀers not
for bundled links, but for end-to-end connections. More-
over, the BACBR requires much less variables and con-
straints then original BCBT. What is also important, the
market prices for aggregate commodities can be determined
on competitive grounds. As the detailed realization of par-
ticular oﬀers is not given in the solution of BACBR model
so the disaggregation is needed. The process of disaggre-
gation may also have some advantages as it can consider
various individual constraints and requirements. The anal-
ysis of disaggregation techniques as well as general model
for disaggregation is given in Section 4. In Section 5 we
summarize our ﬁndings.
2. The Proposed Model
The auction BACBR model stated in this paper falls into
a class of the multicommodity exchange models, that pro-
vide eﬃcient resources allocation solving global economic
welfare maximization problem [10]–[13]. Multicommod-
ity means that market entities (further called bidders) can
trade with bundles (packages) of diﬀerent commodities.
The BCBT model proposed in [10] allows bidders to place
buy oﬀers not for bundled links, but rather for end-to-end
connections. Therefore buyer does not have to know which
links to choose to best allocate the demanded capacity. It
is the decision model that allocates the most eﬃcient links
to paths.
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Basic BCBT model interprets individual bandwidth buy
and sell oﬀers as separate elementary commodities that
correspond to traﬃc demand and network links, respec-
tively. Then, in case of many market participants oﬀering
bandwidth on links connecting the same network nodes or
demanding the same connections paths, the trade is per-
form upon a multigraph – see Figs. 1 and 2. It means that
in the case of BCBT model, only one oﬀer is submitted on
the particular commodity.
Fig. 1. Resource graph for network links modeled as the multi-
graph. One oﬀer concerns one particular network link.
Fig. 2. Resource graph for network demands modeled as a multi-
graph. One oﬀer concerns particular network demand.
In real world, with possibly thousands of bids being auc-
tioned, such an approach may become ineﬃcient. Thus an
aggregation of the BCBT model is required to reduce the
complexity.
The aggregated BACBR model considers aggregate com-
modities structure modeled as a simple graph – see Figs. 3
and 4. It means that in the BACBR model multiple oﬀers
Fig. 3. Resource graph for network demands modeled as the
simple graph. Multiple oﬀers for the particular network resources
exist.
Fig. 4. Resource graph for network demands modeled as the strict
graph. Multiple oﬀers for particular network resources exists.
can be submitted on aggregate link or end-to-end connec-
tion, considered as an aggregate commodity.
3. Mathematical Model
We assume that the communication network consists of
nodes connected by links. The inter-node link may repre-
sent a network resource (bandwidth), that can be an ele-
mentary commodity oﬀered for sale on the bandwidth mar-
ket. However, network resources being traded can be more
complex and can be composed of many parallel links, or
end-to-end node connections represented by paths or sub-
networks.
Every buy oﬀer concerns a point-to-point bandwidth con-
nection between a pair of speciﬁed locations in a com-
munication network. The locations form a set of network
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nodes V . The connections (and links) are unidirectional,
i.e., they have source and sink nodes. First we brieﬂy report
the conventional model BCBT to allow us for the extension
discussion.
3.1. The BCBT Model
The objective of BCBT model [10], [12] is the max-
imization total economic welfare Eq. (1), which is the sum
of total buyers and sellers surpluses. The constraints (2)
and (3) set upper and lower bounds on particular net-
work links (xe) and particular end-to-end network de-
mands (xd). The non-negative variable xed Eq. (5) is in-
terpreted as a bandwidth capacity allocated to network
link e to serve end-to-end demand d. Also, the sum of ca-
pacities allocated to all network demands ∑d∈D xed served
by particular network link e, should not exceed the real-
ization xe of the link Eq. (4). Finally, the sum of all
capacities, provided with incidence matrix ave, allocated
to all network links, serving particular network demand,
should not exceed the realization of the end-to-end de-
mand xd Eq. (6):
ˆQ = max
(
∑
d∈D
Edxd − ∑
e∈E
Sexe
)
, (1)
0 ≤ xd ≤ hd , ∀d∈D, (2)
0 ≤ xe ≤ ye, ∀e∈E , (3)
∑
d∈D
xed ≤ xe, ∀e∈E , (4)
0 ≤ xed , ∀e∈E,d∈D, (5)
∑
e∈E
avexed =


xd v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−xd v = td
, ∀v∈V,d∈D, (6)
where:
indices:
d = 1,2, ...,D buy oﬀers – demands for bandwidth,
v = 1,2, ...,V network nodes,
e = 1,2, ...,E sell oﬀers – network resources;
parameters:
ave = 1 if link e originates in node v,
=−1 if e terminates in node v,
= 0 otherwise,
sd source node for demand d,
td sink node for demand d,
hd required capacity of demand d,
Ed oﬀered unit price for demand d,
ye oﬀered capacity of network link e,
Se oﬀered unit price for network link e;
variables:
xed bandwidth ﬂow serving demand d allocated to net-
work link e,
xd contracted bandwidth capacity for demand d,
xe contracted bandwidth capacity for network link e.
The xe and xd are, respectively, values of realized band-
width on the link e and the demand d. They are also the ac-
cepted oﬀers for link e and demand d – in the BCBT
model sell oﬀers correspond network links and buy of-
fers correspond demand paths resulting in a multigraph.
It means, that for a single commodity only one oﬀer can
be submitted. However, in case of competitive market with
many participants demanding the same connections paths
or oﬀering bandwidth on links connecting the same net-
work nodes, the size of the resource graph would be
enormous.
3.2. The BACBR Model
Now we propose a nontrivial extension to BCBT model –
the model for balancing aggregated communication band-
width resources, where multiple oﬀers for selling a sin-
gle network aggregate resource (i.e., network link), or for
buying the same connections, are handled in an aggregate
manner.
Let us replace the xe variable by the sum of all adequate
bandwidth realizations pl of sell oﬀers concerning partic-
ular network link e:
xe = ∑
l∈S(e)
pl, ∀e∈E . (7)
Variable pl is a realization of lth oﬀer for selling link
(e : l ∈ S(e),S(e′)∩ S(e′′) = /0,∀
e
′
,e
′′
∈E,e′ 6=e′′ ), S(e) ⊂ S is
a subset of sell oﬀers S concerning particular link e. Thus,
we obtain the aggregation of all sell oﬀers submitted on
speciﬁed link e (∑l∈S(e) pl).
Analogously, let us replace the xd variable by the sum of
all adequate bandwidth realizations dm of buy oﬀers con-
cerning particular end-to-end connection d:
xd = ∑
m∈B(d)
dm, ∀d∈D. (8)
Variable dm is a realization of mth oﬀer for buying demand
(d : m ∈ B(d),B(d ′)∩B(d ′′) = /0,∀d′ ,d′′∈D,d′ 6=d′′ ), B(d) ⊂ B
is a subset of buy oﬀers B concerning particular demand d.
Thus, we obtain the aggregation of all buy oﬀers submitted
on speciﬁed connection d (∑m∈B(d) dm).
Last, we need to change the notation of oﬀer parameters:
the oﬀer price we denote as sl for lth sell oﬀer, and em
for mth buy oﬀer. The maximal volume of bandwidth,
associated with the lth oﬀer we denote as pmaxl , analogously,
the maximal volume of bandwidth, associated to mth oﬀer
we denote as dmaxm .
Finally, we obtain the following mathematical model:
ˆQ = max
(
∑
m∈B
emdm−∑
l∈S
sl pl
)
, (9)
0 ≤ pl ≤ pmaxl , ∀l∈S, (10)
0 ≤ dm ≤ dmaxm , ∀m∈B (11)
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∑
d∈D
xed ≤ ∑
l∈S(e)
pl, ∀e∈E , (12)
0 ≤ xed , ∀e ∈ E,∀d ∈ D, (13)
∑
e∈E
avexed =


∑m∈B(d) dm v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−∑m∈B(d) dm v = td
,∀v∈V,d∈D,
(14)
where:
indices:
d = 1,2, ...,D demands for bandwidth,
v = 1,2, ...,V network nodes,
e = 1,2, ...,E network links,
l = 1,2, ...,S oﬀers for selling,
S(e) oﬀers for selling particular link e,
m = 1,2, ...,B oﬀers for buying,
B(d) oﬀers for buying particular demand d;
parameters:
ave = 1 if link e originates in node v,
=−1 if e terminates in node v,
= 0 otherwise,
sd source node for demand d,
td sink node for demand d,
sl selling price for lth oﬀer,
em buying price for mth oﬀer,
pmaxl maximal volume for lth oﬀer,
dmaxm maximal volume for mth oﬀer;
variables:
xed bandwidth ﬂow serving demand d allocated to the
link e,
pl contracted bandwidth capacity for selling oﬀer l,
dm contracted bandwidth capacity for buying oﬀer m.
4. Aggregation and Disaggregation
Paper [5] considers the auction-based pricing of network
bandwidth, where the utilities of particular participants are
aggregated to obtain multicommodity ﬂow problem with
aggregated user. Authors propose disaggregation as a set of
distributed auctions each for one commodity (i.e., network
path). Paper [8] assumes that the exchange may concern
aggregated resources, like bulk bandwidth for aggregate
ﬂows, and virtual paths, virtual private networks, or edge
capacity.
Aggregating of participants’ oﬀers is useful from the mar-
ket operator’s point of view. When a growing number of
oﬀers is submitted on the same link (or the same demand),
the liquidity and competitiveness on such market increases,
as the concentration and market power decreases. Also,
when there are multiple oﬀers submitted on given band-
width resource, it is much more easier to approach to the
competitive price of such a resource.
As the detailed realizations of particular oﬀers are not given
in the solution of BACBR model, a disaggregation process
is needed, which allows us to match the accepted individ-
ual buy and sell oﬀers. From the business point of view,
disaggregation of results of BACBR model assures that ev-
ery buyer knows who will be responsible for its demand
realization and every seller knows to whom the bandwidth
is served. It may be specially important in the case of
the market operator that is not concerned with the network
operations or any access switches [2]. In the process of
disaggregation it is possible to consider various individual
constraints and requirements, not taken into account in the
aggregated model.
Fig. 5. Example solution for BACBR model. Realization of the
path xd1 by a bundle of links x
e
1 −x
e
3 −x
e
5, x
e
1 −x
e
4.
Let us assume results of the BACBR model (Fig. 5). As
we can see from Fig. 5, the demand xd1 was realized by
two link sequences: xe1 − x
e
3 − x
e
5 (A-B-D-C) with share
equal to 0.4 and by the xe1 − xe4 (A-B-C) with share 0.6
(see Fig. 5). Let us assume that bandwidth allocated on the
path xd1 is equal to 10 units of bandwidth (Table 1). The
bandwidth allocated to link xe1 is equal to 10, on link x
e
2
is equal to zero, for links xe3 and x
e
5 allocated bandwidth
is equal to 4, and ﬁnally for link xe4 we have 6 units of
bandwidth allocated.
Table 1
Example solution for BACBR model
xed x
e
1 x
e
2 x
e
3 x
e
4 x
e
5
xd1 10 0 4 6 4
Up to now we know how particular network links serve
particular demands. However, such aggregate allocation
does not give us the answer to the question: how to as-
sign particular realization of the accepted buy oﬀers to
particular accepted sell oﬀers. In other words, results of
the exemplary oﬀer process do not give us the answer to
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the question, how particular oﬀers for buying demand xd1
(i.e., oﬀers d1 and d2 in Fig. 2) will be realized by particular
sell oﬀers (p1, · · · , p8 in Fig. 1).
General model for disaggregation. After solving BACBR
model, we obtain the following results: the volume realiza-
tion of particular sell oﬀers pl∀l∈S, moreover we know how
the sell oﬀers are realized by the network links e : l ∈ S(e).
Respectively, we know the volume realization of particu-
lar buy oﬀers dm∀m∈B, moreover, we know how buy oﬀers
are realized by the appropriate demands d : m ∈ B(d). Fi-
nally, we obtain the aggregated result, the realization of the
demand by particular network links xed∀e∈E,d∈D.
Nevertheless, we need to disaggregate xed variable, and
obtain speciﬁc realization of the particular accepted buy
oﬀers dm (which is a portion of particular demand d : m ∈
B(d) – the oﬀer was submitted on this demand) by particu-
lar accepted sell oﬀers pl (which is a portion of the partic-
ular network resource e : l ∈ S(e) – the oﬀer was submitted
on this link). Therefore, we need to determine variable
zel dm that satisfy the following equation:
∑
l∈S(e)
∑
m∈B(d)
zel dm = xed , ∀e∈E,d∈D. (15)
To obtain correct disaggregation, we need to ﬁnd appropri-
ate values of zel dm .
The ﬁrst stage of disaggregation. This stage assumes
searching for complete and coherent ﬂows for every ac-
cepted buy oﬀer dm. This problem can be decomposed
for every aggregated demand d ∈ D as the subset of par-
ticular buy oﬀers dm corresponds to only one demand d.
Therefore, every accepted buy oﬀer dm should ﬂow from its
source node sd to its sink node td . We obtain the following
equation:
∑
e∈E
aveyedm =


dm v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−dm v = td
, ∀v ∈V,∀m ∈ B(d) .
(16)
To ensure that particular ﬂows for demand will constitute
an aggregated solution, the sum of all ﬂows yedm has to be
equal xed for every link e ∈ E:
∑
m∈B(d)
yedm = xed , ∀e∈E . (17)
The variable yedm is a result of partial disaggregation of pa-
rameter xed . In Table 2 and in Fig. 6 we can see exemplary
Table 2
Results of ﬁrst stage of disaggregation; buy oﬀers are
correctly disaggregated
yedm
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8
6 4 0 1 3 5 1 4
d xed xe1 xe2 xe3 xe4 xe5
d1 = 7
xd1
7 0 2.8 4.2 2.8
d2 = 3 3 0 1.2 1.8 1.2
result of the ﬁrst stage of disaggregation. We can treat the
yedm variable as realization of mth buy oﬀer (which belongs
to the demand d).
Fig. 6. Exemplary solution of the ﬁrst stage of disaggregation
model. We can see yedm variables (y
edm
xxx ) which are realization of
mth buy oﬀer (which belongs to the demand d).
The ﬁrst stage of disaggregation is a general model with
some degrees of freedom, so the number of feasible solu-
tions can be often enormous.
The second stage of disaggregation. The solution of the
ﬁrst stage of disaggregation gives us values of variables
yedm for each e ∈ E . In the second stage we obtain the
disaggregated variables zel dm , which correspond to the re-
alization of particular accepted buying oﬀer dm by the par-
ticular accepted selling oﬀer pl . Note that the selling of-
fer pl belongs to the network link e : l ∈ S(e), because it
was submitted for that link.
Table 3
Results of the second stage of disaggregation
zel dm
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8
6 4 0 1 3 5 1 4
d xed xe1 xe2 xe3 xe4 xe5
d1 = 7
xd1
4.2 2.8 0 0.7 2.1 3.5 0.7 2.8
d2 = 3 1.8 1.2 0 0.3 0.9 1.5 0.3 1.2
General model for the second stage of disaggregation is the
following allocation problem (for separate e ∈ E):
yedm = ∑
l∈S(e)
zel dm , ∀m∈B, (18)
∑
m∈B
zel dm = pl, ∀l∈S(e). (19)
The ﬁrst equation (18) is responsible for disaggregation
of variables yedm into variables zel dm . The second equa-
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tion (19) is responsible for correct allocation of vari-
ables zel dm to obtain values of accepted oﬀers. In Table 3
and in Fig. 7 we can see exemplary results of the sec-
ond stage of disaggregation. We can see, that after solving
both stages, we obtain correct disaggregation, i.e., vari-
ables zel dm .
As in the previous stage, this disaggregation is also general,
so there are possible multiple feasible solutions.
Fig. 7. Exemplary solution of the second stage of disaggregation
model. We can see zeldm variables (z
eldm
xxxx )which are realization of
mth buy oﬀer (which belongs to the demand d) by the lth sell
oﬀer (which belongs to the link e).
Combined disaggregation. Two stages of disaggregation
can be combined into one process. We can replace yedm
from Eq. (16) with Eq. (18), what results in:
∑
e∈E
ave ∑
l∈S(e)
zel dm =


dm v = sdm
0 v 6= sdm ,tdm
−dm v = tdm
, ∀v∈V,∀m∈B .
(20)
Equations (20) plus (19) states general single-stage model
for disaggregation. As there are many feasible solutions to
the general model, many additional speciﬁc requirements
can be incorporated into the process. Below we present
only one simple example of disaggregation method.
Proportional disaggregation. The simplest disaggrega-
tion is the proportional method. It divides accepted buying
oﬀers proportionally, according to proportionality between
selling oﬀers:
zel dm =
pldm
∑l∈S(e) pl
xed =
pldm
∑m∈B(m) dm
. (21)
As the result of such disaggregation we obtain the fol-
lowing results (see Table 3). We can observe that selling
oﬀer p1, which is a portion of link xe1, serves the buying
oﬀer d1, which is a portion of demand xd1 , with 4.2 units
of bandwidth.
5. Summary
The proposed BACBR model for balancing aggregated
communication bandwidth resources assumes aggregation
of particular oﬀers and resources, which results in more
concise aggregate optimization problem for clearing the
multicommodity auction. The solution to the model de-
termines aggregated results, so the need for disaggregation
process appears. We have described two phases of the
general disaggregation model and showed that it may be
performed in one combined disaggregation process. A sim-
ple proportional disaggregation method was also proposed.
Our future line of research includes exploiting some free-
dom in the disaggregation methods to take into account var-
ious individual participants constraints and requirements.
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